7 - Proven at Runtime

Proven at Runtime

The permission model isn't just designed - it's been run end to end and attacked. This page is the evidence.

The full round-trip

XRUIOS.Manager login demo <pw>     # Argon2id wraps the master key; DPAPI seals it to the OS session
XRUIOS.Manager run                 # unseals, launches 27 workers IN PARALLEL, broker up
XRUIOS.SampleApp                    # the Höllvania calendar app connects and calls capabilities

Observed:

  • Login created the user, wrote the public login file + the DPAPI seal. run unsealed the master key with no password prompt.
  • 27/27 workers launched in parallel, each announcing its own loopback port, its own Kyber public key, and its own PSK. The Calendar worker advertised caps=[GetEvents, AddEvent, DeleteEvent]; the rest advertised their placeholder.
  • The app completed the post-quantum handshake (Kyber + AES-256-GCM): SECURE.
  • AddEvent (granted) ran in the Calendar worker and returned a real event id.
  • DeleteEvent (not granted) was refused: XRUIOS.Permission denied 'DeleteEvent' for app:sampleapp.

Every wall in 1 - The Model fired for real: process isolation (27 separate exes), password isolation (a PSK per worker), key isolation (an HKDF key per worker), and the permission check on the one privileged call.

The pentest - four attacks, four refusals

Attack Result
Forged app identity + random password (app:hacker, bogus PSK) hitting the broker No secure channel - the handshake failed because the PSK resolver returns null for an unknown id
Direct-to-worker bypass (skip the Manager, connect straight to the Calendar worker's port) Refused - the worker only completes a handshake with the Manager's PSK, which the attacker doesn't hold
Ungranted capability (DeleteEvent from an app granted only read/add) Denied by XRUIOS.Permission before it reached the worker
Tampered binary (a worker's exe modified after baseline) Notary refused to launch it: FAILED checksum: 2 modified

The tamper refusal was not staged - it happened for real when the workers were rebuilt: Notary compared them against its captured baseline, saw the binaries had changed, and refused every one until the baseline was re-captured. The anti-tamper works because it caught a legitimate change it wasn't told about.

Related: 1 - The Model · 6 - Aether Engine Integration